
Part 1: United States Department of the Interior National Park Service


-Manassas Battlefield Historic District Outside Park Boundaries NRHP Listed: 1/18/2006

Approximately 5,073.10 acres of the battlefield site are located within the authorized boundaries maintained by the National Park Service as Manassas National Battlefield Park. Individual property owners and the Commonwealth of Virginia own approximately 1,396.44 acres.

-National Park Service, American Battlefield Protection Program (Study conducted by PrinceWilliamCounty) 2010

The Manassas Battlefield Historic District contains 6,400 acres and embraces the park as well as adjoining properties that retain their historic integrity. Both the park and its associated historic district are listed in the National Register of Historic Places. In addition, the park is designated by Prince William County as a County Registered Historic Site.





Battlefield Study Area: This area consists of locations where a high level of visual integrity has survived and the historic landscape has remained substantially intact with only minor intrusions. consists of lands peripheral to the Battlefield Core Area where troop movements, encampments, staging areas, field hospitals and similar activities occurred and are directly related to, but ancillary to, combat.


Archeological investigations to the west of the present Manassas National Battlefield Park property, <mark>in the vicinity of Pageland Lane, have revealed prehistoric and historic sites.</mark> This includes the investigation of the property associated with the Dunklin Monument (44PW579), <mark>the mass burial site of soldiers who died during the Second Battle of Manassas (44PW593)</mark>, and army pit latrines dating from the early 20th century (44PW594). Additionally, Site 44PW580, on the south side of Pageland Lane, is associated with the unfinished railroad (44PW299).

Part 1: Sources for documents and supporting details:

1)Virginia Department of Historic Resources <u>https://www.dhr.virginia.gov/historic-registers/076-0271/</u> 2)NRHP Approved Listing Form (98pages) <u>https://www.dhr.virginia.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/076-0271_ManassasBattlefieldParkHD_2004_BI_NRHP_nomination.pdf</u> 3)PWC <u>https://eservice.pwcgov.org/planning/documents/MNBP_Viewshed_Plan-20100510.pdf</u> 4)ABPP Site with Documents https://parkplanning.nps.gov/projectHome.cfm?projectID=22552

REPORT FOR HISTORICAL COMMISSION SPECIAL MEETING 10/3/2022 PREPARED BY MORGAN BLAINE PEARSALL II, GAINESVILLE DISTRICT HISTORICAL COMMISSIONER

Part 1 Supplemental



I) PAGELAND



Historic Significance

This site just west of Pageland Lane is outside the NPS boundary. During the Battle of Second Manassas, this location would have been in the rear of the Confederate right flank. The brigades of Jubal Early and Henry Forno occupied the rige on Pageland Farm on the morning of August 29, 1862, for the purpose of covering Jackson's right flank until Longstreet's forces arrived later that morning.

Manassas Battlefields Viewsheds Plan

Rev

While the comprehensive plan's community design element does address numerous gateways and corridors, such as the Buckland segment of Route 29 lying west of the battlefield, it does not address areas within close proximity to the battlefield. This element includes a section on office development. Although it does not specifically address building heights, it suggests a "human scale" at the street level, and the images of positive examples tend to be in the five-story range.

The cultural resources element of the plan recommends that the County develop a "viewshed policy around County Registered Historic Sites (CRHS) and criteria for implementing that policy." The national park and Bristoe Station are both designated as CRHSs, but adjacent lands around them, including their viewsheds, are not. The element goes on to recommend other policies supportive of battlefield viewshed preservation, including conducting a viewshed analysis, buffering to protect the integrity of historic resources, preserving vegetation, utilizing clustered development to preserve open space, and considering low-impact land uses near historic lands, including battlefields.

Manassas Battlefields Viewsheds Plan

Revised: May 10, 2010

Background Study

Road Expansions

As the battlefield's surrounding built environment continues to grow and traffic levels increase, pressure will grow to expand the physical capacity of roads around and traversing the battlefield park. In fact, one such proposal is now in the planning stage.

Tri-County Parkway

This VDOT project is intended to transform the historic Pageland Lane into a higher capacity north-south thoroughfare. It is currently undergoing environmental impact review as part of the planning process, including the Section 106 process led by the Virginia Department of Historic Resources (VDHR) to potentially mitigate impacts to historic resources. See the plan graphic at right.

Not only would this project result in the alteration of the alignment and profile of a historic road, but it would negatively impact multiple viewsheds. In particular, the Stuart's Hill and S. D. Lee Artillery Position PVP viewsheds and the Pageland HBV would be substantially impacted because of their close proximity to the propose "parkway." On the other hand, this road's improvement might serve as a "pressure release valve" for traffic on Route 29, potentially lessening the odds of that critical road ever being widened.



Proposed Tri-County Parkway

Source: VDOT

National Historic Preservation Act Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) requires that a process be followed intended to offer protection to any historic resources either listed on, or determined eligible for, the National Register of Historic Places. This process is designed to identify and avoid, or at least mitigate, adverse impacts on historic resources. Unfortunately, "Section 106 Review" is limited to those projects involving Federal funds or licensing, such as Federal transportation funding, Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funding, or an Army Corps of Engineers permit. Compliance with Section 106 is the responsibility of the Federal agency. Section 106 requires consultation, with the Virginia Department of Historic Resources (DHR), local governments, and other interested parties, When an adverse effect is determined the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation is notified and given the opportunity to participate. The Federal agency leads the consultation process and makes the final determination on whether to proceed with the undertaking and how adverse effects will be mitigated. While it offers little help for private sector activities not involving Federal funding or licensing, Section 106 Review can be a potentially valuable tool with regard to Federally licensed and funded projects. While it cannot always save an historic site or viewshed. Section 106 Review usually, at a minimum, allows for the documentation of the resource for future generations. Examples of conceivable activities that could potentially impact Manassas Battlefield viewsheds and would be required to undergo Section 106 Review include roadway expansions (Pageland Lane, Route 29, Route 234, etc.), new road expansion, and new cell towers. The fact should never be overlooked that the greatest threat to battlefield viewsheds within the national park is road expansions, while the greatest potential ally against such expansions is Section 106 Review.

Part 2: Camp at Pageland July August and September 1861 Measles Epidemic



-21st North Carolina Infantry aka 11th NC Volunteers Regiment (Infantry)

We continued to hold the same position on 21 July—when the first battle of Mansassas was foughtAfter this battle, we went into camp on Bull Run, where the regiment suffered greatly from sickness.

-16th Mississippi Infantry

Mustered in about 950 men

Camped next to the 21st North Carolina (which was already suffering from a measles epidemic), 15th

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All agree that the 21st Georgia suffered the worst. At one time nearly the whole regiment was on the sick list and the officers could hardly get enough men to stand guard.

-15th Alabama Infantry (900 men)

the men of the 15th Alabama got off the cars, formed ranks, and marched about five miles from the station to an old field called Pageland, a flat open plain just north of Warrenton Turnpike where the Page family had intended to build a mansion and develop a plantation...<mark>.</mark>

went into camp beside the 21st North Carolina, the 16th Mississippi, and the 21st Georgia Regiments. Across the broad expanse of field, practically nothing but row upon row of tents could be seen. The noise of camp—officers shouting, feet plodding on dry sod, bugles blowing, drums tapping—echoed over Pageland in one vast discord of sound. Although the water in the camp was bad, the weather was hot, and many thirsty soldiers decided to drink the tainted water rather than suffer from dehydration. Colonel Cantey saw to it that his companies drilled hard every day, and from miles around one could see the dust rising from Pageland like the billowing smoke of a forest fire....the camp less than two miles from the fields where the Battle of Manassas had been fought,...

The first man in the regiment to die was Andrew J. Folmar, 18, a private in Company I. Then many others quickly became sick and had no strength or immunity to fight off the overwhelming disease. About **100 of the regiment's men died over the span of six weeks**. A military **funeral and burial** were performed for each death, and obsequies soon became part of the camp's daily routine. Overcome with emotion from this profusion of sickness and death, one private wrote in despair: "Beneath the soil of Prince William [County], now slumber in quiet repose, secure from summer's heat and winter's cold, from the cares of life and shock of strife, the noblest and best of the regiment."

...and <mark>by winter **over 200 men** would die from disease.</mark> The regiment still maintained a schedule of four hours a day of drill.

Changed camp to the Centreville area, named Camp Toombs. **About 300 of the sickest men were left behind,** *but the epidemic continued at the new camp.*

The 15th Alabama was ordered to Pageland Field, Va. for drill. At Pageland, the regiment suffered its first 150 losses to its worst enemy- the measles. Camp life in 1861/1862 was congested and filthy. Disease and sickness plagued the new soldiers. But Colonels seeking political favor refused to move the sick to hospitals: the more men they were able to display, the better their chances for promotion to General. To escape the measles, the 15th was ordered to Camp Toombes, Va. in September 1861.

Part 2 Supplemental

21st North Carolina Infantry aka 11th NC Volunteers Regiment (Infantry)

1861 July 21st: Battle of Manassas (Bull Run) The regiment was not engaged. It took part in the general pursuit to Centreville after the battle.

<u>1862 August 28th-30th:</u> Second Battle of Manassas (Bull Run) The regiment lost 51 men at Groveton. Lieutenant Colonel Sanders Fulton was killed, and Major B.Y. Graves was wounded. Lieutenants David P. Jackson of Company D and Wilbourn B. Shoub of Company F were killed. Captains John W. Beard of Company F and M.L. Patterson of Company I, Lieutenants J.W. Miller and Albert Alspaugh of Company D and Vincent H. Hazlip and Mills V. Tuttle of Company G were wounded.

-16th Mississippi Infantry

1861 June 8th: Mustered in about 950 men under Colonel Carnot Posey, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Clarke, Major Thomas J. Bankston and Adjutant Thomas R. Stockdale.

<u>1861 August:</u> Camped next to the 21st North Carolina (which was already suffering from a measles epidemic), 15th Alabama and 21st Georgia.

<u>1861 Mid-September:</u> Changed camp to the Centreville area, named Camp Toombs.

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<u>1861 Summer:</u> The 21st Georgia Infantry Regiment was organized at Richmond, Virginia by expanding the 4th Georgia Infantry Battalion to a regiment. The regiment camped next to the 21st North Carolina (which was already suffering from a measles epidemic) and the 15th Alabama.

Mid-September: Moved to the Centreville area to Camp Toombs.

1862 August 28th-30th: Second Battle of Manassas (Bull Run)

The regiment brought 242 men to the field and lost almost 75% casualties. Captain Joseph Waddail of Company C was killed. Lieutenant George W. Aderhold of Company A was killed. Lieutenant Thomas Attaway of Company B was mortally wounded. Lieutenant Merril T. Castleberry of Company C was wounded again.

-15th Alabama Infantry

<u>1861 June-July 1st</u>: Sent to Knoxville, then to Virginia, where it was attached to Crittenden's (later Trimble's) Brigade. General Zollicoffer's report states that of the <u>900 men</u> of the 15th at Knoxville, "only 300 are fit for duty" 1861 <u>August 21st</u>: Regiment received orders to move to the front

<u>1861 August 22nd</u>: The regiment marched through Richmond, where it was reviewed by President Davis. After a speech by Alabama Governor John Sorter it boarded a train for Manassas. Reached Manassas Junction in the early evening and marched five miles north to Pageland, just north of the Warrenton Pike.

<u>1861 Mid-September</u>: Changed camp to the Centreville area, named Camp Toombs. About 300 of the sickest men were left behind, but the epidemic continued at the new camp.

1862 August 28th-30th: Second Battle of Manassas (Bull Run)

The regiment was commanded by Major A.A. Lowther. It lost 20 killed and Captain Richard E. Wright and 91 other men wounded out of 440 engaged.

The 15th Alabama is referenced on two trailside markers on the Deep Cut loop trail on the Manassas battlefield.

Part 2: Sources for documents and supporting details:

21st North Carolina https://www.carolana.com/NC/Civil_War/11th_nc_volunteers_regiment.html

16th Mississippi <u>https://civilwarintheeast.com/confederate-regiments/mississippi/16th-mississippi-infantry-regiment/</u>

21st Georgia https://civilwarintheeast.com/confederate-regiments/georgia/21st-georgia-infantry/

21st Georgia INVESTIGATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY ON PAGELAND FARM, 1861-1865A Historical Sketch of the Quitman Guards.. p. 11

15th Alabama <u>http://civilwarrx.blogspot.com/2016/01/civil-war-soldiers-decimated-by-disease.html</u>


15th Alabama https://civilwarintheeast.com/confederate-regiments/alabama/15th-alabama-infantry/

REPORT FOR HISTORICAL COMMISSION SPECIAL MEETING 10/3/2022

PREPARED BY MORGAN BLAINE PEARSALL II, GAINESVILLE DISTRICT HISTORICAL COMMISSIONER

Civil War Soldiers: Decimated by Disease

By Glenn W. LaFantasie



Disease and primitive medical knowledge were the Civil War soldier's worst enemies. For every soldier killed in battle, two died of disease. During their first summer of service in the Confederate army, William C. Oates and his comrades of the 15th Alabama Infantry Regiment watched as the first casualties dropped from their ranks, not from wounds inflicted by their Federal foes but from the deadlier onslaught of microbes and viruses in their camp. The Alabamains learned before they ever fired a single shot in anger that war often brought suffering and death where they were least expected, and that this particular war would seldom show mercy to anyone caught in the swath of its deadly scythe.

Oates was a lawyer, newspaper publisher and editor, as well as a former fugitive from justice who had spent part of his youth as a gambler in Texas. In July 1861 he formed a militia company in Henry County, Alabama—the "Henry Pioneers"—that become Company G of the newly established 15th Alabama Infantry, under the command of Colonel James Cantey. Oates was named captain of Company G. From Fort Mitchell on the Chattahoochee River, Cantey moved his regiment—about 1,000 men strong—north by train to Richmond, where the 15th Alabama spent a few weeks drilling and training. Then, on August 21, the regiment received orders to proceed to the front. When they heard the news, the men cheered and sang all through the night.

The next morning, Cantey led the regiment through the streets of Richmond to the railroad depot, where President Jefferson Davis reviewed the troops and complimented Cantey on their fine appearance. The newly elected governor of Alabama, John Gill Shorter, a prominent Democrat from Eufaula with whom Oates was politically allied, was also there to see the 15th off, and he delivered a short address before the men boarded the cars. According to one Alabama soldier, Gill's speech "did our hearts good," for apparently the governor stirringly invoked the memory of Patrick Henry who, 80 years before, had denounced King George III by declaring, "Give me liberty, or give me death!" Once on the train, the men gave a rousing Rebel yell, the whistle blew, and the wooden stock cars lurched forward toward Manassas Junction.

All around Centreville and Manassas, near where the Confederates had won their first major victory in a battle fought on July 21, Brigadier General Joseph E. Johnston had extended the Southern lines. Reinforcements from all over the South were being rushed to the Manassas defenses as recruits poured into the army in the wake of the fighting along Bull Run. By August, Johnston's army numbered less than 40,000 soldiers, and the general believed he needed more men to keep the Federal army from contemplating—and perhaps succeeding in—another southward push.

As the train carrying the 15th Alabama passed through little hamlets—places no bigger or even smaller than Abbeville, the county seat where Oates had mustered in the Henry Pioneers—on its ambling journey north, Virginians stood by the tracks cheering the soldiers and waving their hats and handkerchiefs. At each stop, Gus McClendon, one of Oates's privates in Company G, remembered that "the patriotic ladies and beautiful Virginia girls would be gathered...to welcome us, distributing their fruits and flowers and cheering us on with expressions of delight when informed we were from Alabama."

It took all day for the train to reach Manassas Junction, where the men of the 15th Alabama got off the cars, formed ranks, and marched about five miles from the station to an old field called Pageland, a flat open plain just north of Warrenton Turnpike where the Page family had intended to build a mansion and develop a plantation. On the march, Captain Benjamin Gardner of Company I led his men while he held a great umbrella over his head. "It had a most unmilitary appearance," Oates remembered years later, "but the captain was large and corpulent, a lawyer by profession, unused to the sun, 52 years old, and therefore excusable."

The 15th Alabama went into camp beside the 21st North Carolina, the 16th Mississippi, and the 21st Georgia Regiments. Across the broad expanse of field, practically nothing but row upon row of tents could be seen. The noise of camp—officers shouting, feet plodding on dry sod, bugles blowing, drums tapping—echoed over Pageland in one vast discord of sound. Although the water in the camp was bad, the weather was hot, and many thirsty soldiers decided to drink the tainted water rather than suffer from dehydration. Colonel Cantey saw to it that his companies drilled hard every day, and from miles around one could see the dust rising from Pageland like the billowing smoke of a forest fire.

"Drilling and performing the routine of camp duty was the regular order," recalled Oates. Despite the arduous regularity of drilling every day for at least four hours, the men did have some respite and moments of gaiety and laughter. Oates fondly remembered "the fife of old Hildebrand, and Jimmie Newberry's and Pat Brannon's drums, as they were heard at reveille and tattoo." Colonel Cantey's teamster also brought a smile to the men's faces: He "was the only man connected with the regiment," Oates said, "who could surpass the Colonel in profanity." But camp life involved mostly endless marching and backbreaking work. As Gus McClendon remembered: "The fatigue duty consisted of policing the camp, looking after its sanitary condition, cutting and hauling wood, and going with the forage and commissary wagons to the depot at Manassas Junction, to assist in loading them with the supplies for man and beast."

With the camp less than two miles from the fields where the Battle of Manassas had been fought, Oates decided to take Company G and some other men from the regiment on a tour of the ground. It had just been a month since the Confederate victory, and the Alabamians were all curious to see what a battlefield really looked like. At first, the terrain matched their own romantic conceptions of the battle and the heroes who had fallen fighting for their righteous cause. Oates recalled that white posts "had been set up to mark each of the places where fell General [Bernard] Bee, of South Carolina, Colonels [Francis] Bartow, Georgia; [Charles] Fisher, of North Carolina, and [Egbert] Jones, of Alabama."

The men walked over the ground with expressions of awe and wonder on their faces. Caspar W. Boyd, a private in Company I, wrote home to his parents that he "found a sight ther that I never saw befor." Some of the dead from the battle had been hastily buried and their arms and hands protruded from beneath thin mounds of dirt. Boyd and his comrades even discovered severed hands and feet on the ground. The carcasses of dead horses still littered the field. He remarked that they strolled by the Widow Henry house, where the widow herself had been "kiled on her bed" during the battle.

Oates distinctly remembered, almost 45 years later, the pungent smell of fennel and pennyroyal—weeds growing on the battlefield that had been mashed down during the fight and still gave off their recognizable aromas. Some of Oates's men thought the odor came from "dead Yankees," concluding that Northerners must have a different smell in death than Southerners. A few of the Alabamians reacted to the battlefield with less solemnity than did Oates or Caspar Boyd. Gus McClendon reported that some of the men treated the outing like

a picnic, and they felt "like birds turned out of a cage." Nevertheless, he and his companions could not avoid being amazed at the sight of the remnants of a stand of pine where the 7th Georgia was known to have held its ground during the battle. The trees had been chopped to pieces by musket volleys. "It was a wonder to us," wrote McClendon, "how a man could live in such a place."

If nothing else, the excursion to the Manassas battlefield gave the Alabama boys reason to ponder war and its grim realities. Oates and his men roamed fields where the grass was still stained red with dried blood, where unexploded shells lay exposed to view, and where minié balls covered patches of ground in a thick lead carpet. To McClendon, the "horrible" battlefield offered "sad scenes" that "furnished food for reflection." Although some tried to treat the tour as a frolic, no one who visited the battlefield that day would ever regard war in quite the same fashion as he had done before.

"At the time," wrote McClendon, "I was full of malice and hatred for the 'Boys in Blue' and was just as anxious to kill him as he was to kill me, yet when I would stop and take a second thought, and gaze upon those little mounds I could truthfully say of the dead 'Boy in Blue' that sometime, and somewhere, he had been 'somebody's darling.' "When the men walked solemnly back to Pageland and reached their camp, they thought their short journey had showed them the worst of war. They had no idea of the far worse horrors yet to come.

Those horrors began at Pageland. It was in the Confederate camps there that, in the words of one private in the 15th Alabama, "the reaper commenced the harvest of death" that would continue for the regiment until its surrender at Appomattox. When the 15th Alabama had first arrived at Pageland, its closest neighbor in the camp, the 21st North Carolina, was already struggling with an epidemic of measles and serious outbreaks of mumps and typhoid. All of these diseases were—and still are—highly contagious, although in our modern times we have grown accustomed to dealing with them during childhood and have vaccines that prevent their spread and other medicines that quickly wipe them out. In the Civil War, measles was by far, as Oates himself declared, "the worst enemy of our army," for it spread rapidly among the adult soldiers who had developed no immunity to the disease and who could do nothing to fight it.

Measles cut through the ranks of the 15th Alabama at the encampment like a biblical plague or the medieval Black Death. No one, including the small number of surgeons assigned to the army, knew that the disease was carried on droplets through the air and that proximity to the virus meant almost certain infection. In this respect, it is somewhat miraculous that the entire Confederate camp at Pageland was not stricken with the disease. Infected soldiers experienced high fever, rash, runny noses, watery eyes, and coughing. Due to the lack of a vaccine and effective treatments, few men who were infected survived the illness. After the initial symptoms, their condition generally worsened. Some soldiers came down with pneumonia and encephalitis (brain inflammation) as a result of measles; others suffered middle-ear infections, severe diarrhea, and convulsions. The worst cases—and there were hundreds of them among the troops of the 15th Alabama—resulted in death.

The first man in the regiment to die was Andrew J. Folmar, 18, a private in Company I. Then many others quickly became sick and had no strength or immunity to fight off the overwhelming disease. About 100 of the regiment's men died over the span of six weeks. A military funeral and burial were performed for each death, and obsequies soon became part of the camp's daily routine. Overcome with emotion from this profusion of sickness and death, one private wrote in despair: "Beneath the soil of Prince William [County], now slumber in quiet repose, secure from summer's heat and winter's cold, from the cares of life and shock of strife, the noblest and best of the regiment."

Those who fell to sickness were stricken by the fear—and the near certainty—of approaching death. Sick and well alike yearned for the comforts of home and to be magically transported from this strange land where so many men were dying. For those on death's doorstep, the longing for home was even more pronounced. "The thought of home is ever uppermost in the mind," admitted one Alabamian, "and a wish exists to be buried with their fathers and the companies of their youth." Their wish would not be granted. At Pageland, the "Dead March" was so frequently heard that men became inured to it and soon did not even inquire as to who had died or was being buried. The endless deaths produced a "crude shock" among the men of the 15th Alabama and, as anyone might expect, "threw a gloom" over the camp that could not be shaken off.

So many men were sick that the routine camp duty for those who remained healthy became more strenuous than ever, for now there were fewer hands to do the work. Throughout the desolation of this epidemic, the 15th Alabama—just like all the other regiments—was ordered to keep up its drill four hours a day, although those who were not sick began to lose their strength under the physical burdens they had to bear.

Oates became outraged at the desperate situation. He faulted the army for keeping the sick in the same camp with the healthy men, which ensured that those who were not yet sick soon would be. Years later he wrote in anger:

"I do not know who was responsible for it, but it was a great mistake. There was not that care taken of the men of any regiment, so far as my observation extended, which foresight, prudence and economy of war material—leaving humanity out of the question— imperatively demanded....Had the Confederate authorities made more persistent efforts than they did, hospitals could have been more established in sufficient numbers to have saved the lives of hundreds and thousands of good men, which were for the want of them unnecessarily sacrificed."

Oates believed that the surgeons could be blamed as well. They were "criminally negligent," he said, "for not earnestly protesting against such sacrifices of human life." He reached a bitter, but obvious, conclusion: "This folly lost to the service more men than were put out of it by the enemy's bullets."

Someone in Johnston's high command eventually decided that the Alabamians had stayed in Pageland long enough, and around the middle of September the 15th Alabama, along with several other regiments, received orders to transfer their camps closer to Centreville. Oates and the other capable officers and men of the 15th struck their tents under a sweltering sun, leaving about 300 of the regiment's sick behind, and marched up and down the swales of the Warrenton Turnpike toward Bull Run. Surely the sights and sounds of death had been more than enough for them at Pageland, but the Alabamians once more had to march across the Manassas battlefield, where those dour reminders of war and combat remained exposed in their shallow graves. One of Oates's men later wrote that the decomposing carcasses of humans and beasts spoke "in dumb eloquence" of man's inhumanity.

From the battlefield, Oates led his men—beaten down by the heat, their own fatigue, and somber thoughts of death—along the Alexandria Pike until they reached a vast open field, not altogether unlike Pageland, about five miles east of Centreville and three miles west of Fairfax Court House. There they established Camp Toombs, named in honor of Robert Augustus Toombs of Georgia, who had resigned his appointment as Confederate secretary of state to become a brigadier general. (Oates called him "Georgia's most erratic and greatest talker.") Not far from the camp were "bold springs" of water, the kind Virginia was noted for, Oates said happily.

The measles predictably followed the column from Pageland to Camp Toombs, even though the sickest men had been quarantined at Pageland. The men of the 15th Alabama, and of a good number of other regiments as well, kept dying. Barnett "Bud" Cody, a private in the 15th Alabama who was the son of a clergyman and Oates's playmate in their younger days, became ill and began to fear for his life. The doctor told him to stay in his tent, which soldiers were not allowed to do, especially when it came time for drill and dress parade. Oates, however, released Cody from duty from several days and allowed him to get stronger.

The army had an epidemic on its hands, and no one seemed to know quite what to do about it. The men turned to religion, as people and particularly soldiers—do in times of doubt or utter despair. They were desperate, these young Confederate boys who cherished their Bibles and wrote home to their families to inform them that they kept up with their Scripture readings despite the taxing demands that the army placed on them every day. While Gus McClendon was on guard duty one day, a little girl gave him a Bible as a present, all carefully inscribed with the girl's name. He carried the book through several battles, treasuring the gift and honoring the girl who had given it to him. In camp, an itinerant preacher arrived to do some Bible thumping and held a prayer meeting that attracted large numbers of soldiers. The preacher handed out Bibles to the men, but only if they would promise to carry the Good Book with them, which many of them did. As the Confederates camped around Fairfax Court House and Centreville waited for the war to erupt into battle again, which it did not do during these long weeks in the early autumn of 1861, separate hospitals for each regiment's roster of sick men were finally established. The 15th Alabama's was set up at Haymarket, a little village of a handful of houses and shops 10 miles west of Manassas Junction. Ill and dying soldiers from the 15th Alabama, including the ones who had been left behind at Pageland and those who had more recently succumbed to disease in Camp Toombs, were transported in uncomfortable springless wagons to the field hospital in Haymarket.

The village, located about six miles southwest of the Manassas battlefield, was not a perfect place to set up a hospital. South and west of the town a marshy stretch of woods produced more than a sufficient quantity of "bad air" and "bad water" that Civil War doctors incorrectly believed were the causes of contagious diseases.

The men of the 15th Alabama were brought to St. Paul's Episcopal Church, and as many of them as would fit were laid out on the pews in this house of God. For some, those who held to their faith, knowing they were housed in a church gave them succor and hope. For others, they must have been pleased, at the very least, to have a sturdy and dry roof over their heads. Many of the sick, however, were quartered in tents raised in the fields around the church, the fields that already held those soldiers who had not recovered from their wounds after the Battle of Manassas. Others were given beds of straw and hay under the only protection available—the tall trees that shaded the yard around the church.

The sick were attended by Dr. Francis A. Stanford, a native of Georgia who had enlisted in the 15th Alabama at Fort Mitchell on the Chattahoochee, and by a Dr. Shepherd of Eufaula, Alabama, who was nearly 75 years old. Stanford had carefully selected Haymarket as the site of the regimental hospital. One soldier said of Stanford that he missed "no opportunity to provide for the well-being of the invalids." This Alabamian had nothing but praise for the good doctor: "All of his time and talent is devoted to his profession and the amelioration of the suffering. Day by day we see him on his rounds of mercy from the rising of the sun until 'the going down thereof,' and from dark until midnight, in fair weather and foul, and oh! ungrateful humanity; we hear him abused the remaining six [hours of the day]."

Convalescents provided the nursing care to their comrades at the hospital. Oates visited St. Paul's and described with a critical eye what he saw there:

"At this improvised hospital there was neither accommodations nor comfort; no bedding but the soldier's blanket, with his knapsack for a pillow, and no nourishment but army rations; a scant supply of medicine and no medical attention worth having, except such as old Dr. Shepherd...could give....The nights in October were cold, and early in the month there was frost, and the suffering of the sick men was intolerable....It was no uncommon sight at that hospital to see six or seven corpses of 15th Alabama men laid out at once."

There were probably worse places to die than under those high trees (heavenly trees, the locals call them) or in the peaceful fields surrounding the church or in the quiet chancel of St. Paul's in Haymarket. But the men did die, and whether the place was good or bad, serene or bedlam, the only thing that mattered was that poor boys who could not do anything to save themselves, young men a very long way from their homes in Alabama, were slipping away. In time, the epidemic abated and the deaths finally ceased, but the Confederate forces in northern Virginia had already paid a very stiff price by losing good men, young men who had not yet even experienced the horror of combat but who had come to know of hell by confronting an invisible enemy against whom they had no defense.

At Camp Toombs, where the remainder of the 15th Alabama spent that autumn, camp life fell into the same old routines. Company and battalion drill, said Oates, was the daily occupation. Years afterward he remembered: "Occasionally we were aroused by a rumor, incident to such a life, concerning the advance or other movements of the enemy; but, having no foundation, the excitement soon subsided. Later in the war the soldiers denominated such rumors as 'grapevine telegrams' and paid no attention to them." In the

loneliness of an army camp, with thousands of fellow soldiers all around, some of the men, Oates claimed, died of homesickness.

As for the sick and dying at Haymarket, Oates could not take his mind off them. Their suffering, as he had said, was unbearable—to them and to their comrades who survived. It is not known precisely how many men the 15th Alabama buried in the fields around St. Paul's Church, where their remains still lay after all this time. A stone marker near the entrance to the church states flatly, without mention of the dead of the 15th Alabama: "In this area are buried 80 unknown Confederate soldiers who died of wounds after the battle of Manassas, July 21, 1861."


Oates thought that at least 150 men died there and were buried in the churchyard, but in old age, as he wrote his memoirs and strained to remember the details of the Haymarket hospital, he caught himself and confessed that the number must have been much greater. The adjutant's report for the month of November 1861 alone listed 60 dead. With sadness in his heart, Oates said he thought the estimates were all low. And he was probably right. It seems likely that no less than 200 men from the 15th Alabama, and perhaps considerably more than that, fell from disease at Haymarket and are buried in the fields (or what is left of them) to the north and west of the church building.

Haymarket was not unique in the autumn of 1861, for there were hospital sites just like the one at St. Paul's near practically every army camp, Union and Confederate, from Virginia to Texas. The hell faced by the men of the 15th Alabama at Haymarket was experienced by thousands of soldiers on both sides. Few of the men who got sick in their camps recovered from their illnesses; most who contracted measles or mumps or whooping cough or typhoid—or any of the other highly contagious and highly lethal diseases that sliced through Civil War armies—died without ever really understanding what had happened to them or why they had to die. Over the next four years, disease continued to take its toll in the Confederate and Union ranks, and the terrible scenes that had taken place at Pageland, Camp Toombs, and Haymarket would repeat themselves across the American countryside until the war, and all its hard suffering, finally ended.

What William C. Oates and the boys of the 15th Alabama learned in the late summer and autumn 1861 was a lesson learned by every soldier in every war. It was a lesson as old as time. War is all misery, cruelty, and hell. And all too often young soldiers—brave and true boys—give their lives for no good reason at all.

Glenn W. LaFantasie is the author of Gettysburg Requiem: The Life of William C. Oates (Oxford University Press, 2006). This article was first published in MHQ, Spring 2004. From: historynet.com Civic-minded people began to call for preparedness. Newspapers not only exhorted the ladies to be more attentive, they sensibly requested the setting up of more hospitals.

From The Baltimore Sun (copied from the Richmond Examiner), Baltimore, MD, 20 Aug 1861, Page 1. LOC.



NNN

https://jeffersbrotherscw.blogspot.com/2020/04/post-27-measles-in-camp.html

Prioleau Henderson, author of Autobiography of Arab, in his chapter about the arrival of the Beaufort District Troop at Manassas Junction, remembered his own serious bout with typhoid fever. Like Major Griffin and Tom Jeffers, his memories of the gruesome sights on the battlefield were closely linked to worries about the impure drinking water and inevitable diseases.

From Autobiography of Arab, page 18-19:

We arrived at Manassas on the 22d of July, the day after the battle...How grieved I felt for the dead horses and men, the wounded and mangled more than the dead...The Legion went into camp on Bull Run, very near the battlefield. In fact, the doctors said that was the reason so many of our men were down sick with typhoid fever. We horses, you see, it could not affect. From the Beaufort Troop alone there were a great many sick, three dangerously ill - Lieut. Wilson Broughton, Plato Searson, and my master. The latter was taken to a house near Brentsville, owned by Mrs. Foster, or as she was commonly called by her neighbors and friends, "Aunt Peggy Foster," and old time Virginia lady...

James B. Griffin (now promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in the shuffle after the death of Colonel Johnson) turned his attention to the growing problem, writing to Leila on August 11, 1861 (from *A Gentleman and an Officer*, pages 115-117):

My Darling Wife

... Our Legion is in a bad condition on account of sickness. We have a great many cases of the Measles - Lost another man last night. ... Lt Crafton is Sick and I think taking the measles. I still continue to escape them. I am, however exposed to them daily. ...

The editors of *A Gentleman and an Officer*, Judith McArthur and Orville Vernon Burton, footnoted page 119 with evidence that Griffin contracted the measles in mid-August. James Conner, newly appointed Major of Hampton Legion Infantry, wrote to his mother on August 29: **"I have not been writing much lately, not having the time, Colonel Hampton being sick with some sort of Malarial fever, and the Lieutenant Colonel** [Griffin] down with the infantile complaint of measles."

https://jeffersbrotherscw.blogspot.com/2020/07/post-29-many-of-our-men-were-down-sick.html

Part 3: The Field Hospitals and Casualties

-Total Casualties

ESTIMATED CASUALTIES 22,177 Union 13,824 Confederates 8,353


-August 28 1862

Number of Union Soldiers Engaged Roughly 2,800 (killed, wounded, captured/missing) Number of Confederate Soldiers Engaged Roughly 3,000 (killed, wounded, captured/missing)

On August 28, Jackson's command engaged at Brawner's Farm in the opening day of the Second Battle of Manassas. Sometime during the fighting that day, Willie Preston fell mortally wounded. Carried off the battlefield, Willie was brought to a field hospital, and Dr. Hunter McGuire examined his injuries. Lacking details, the best medical conclusion from the currently available primary sources suggest that Willie did not endure an operation and that McGuire determined on a type of palliative care for the young man's final hours.

-Dr. Marsteller

Brigadier General Charles Field was among the southern casualties carried to the Marsteller House during the Second Battle of Manassas. On August 29th, while leading his infantry brigade, part of A.P. Hill's "Light Division" on Jackson's left flank near Sudley, Field was seriously wounded in the hip. Since wounds to the body often proved fatal, the surgeons initially had little hope he would survive. Mrs. Field, then at Farmville, learned of the general's condition, rushed to join her husband and found him in the same room she had occupied the previous winter. 9 Probably in no small part due to the care provided by his wife, General Field eventually recovered and returned to duty. Others were not as fortunate as General Field. Many died at the field hospitals before, during and after surgery. Under the circumstances at that time the armies had little choice except to bury the dead on the field where they fell or, if taken to a field hospital, at those locations. It may have been expedient to dig mass graves where large numbers of dead were collected.



https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3883p.ct001421/?sp=1&r=0.348,0.255,0.199,0.122,0

-Phillips Cemetery

Two stone one labeled Phillips and the other Civil War Company (Is this the Phillips Legion?)



-The Cross Farm

It is believed that the Cross home served as a Confederate field hospital during the Second Battle of Manassas. Although corroborating documentation is elusive, the house would have been ideally situated for such use by Stonewall Jackson's medical staff. A family cemetery is known to exist on the property and it is likely that there could also be unmarked graves in the vicinity for the mortally wounded Confederates who died before they could be transported to a more permanent general hospital further south like at Warrenton or Gordonsville.

Sources for documents and supporting details:

Willie Preston <u>https://emergingcivilwar.com/2019/08/29/willie-preston-placeholder/</u> Marsteller: INVESTIGATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY ON PAGELAND FARM, 1861-1865A James Burgess Manassas National BP 1993 Watt Tracts: RELIC

Part 3 Supplemental

Historical Significance of the Prince William 234 Associates (Watt) Tracts

The area comprising the Prince William 234 Associates Tracts was at the time of the Civil War part of the "Rock Hill Farm" owned by John Cross. The farm contained 360 acres of which 250 acres was cleared land and 100 acres of that was under cultivation. Catharpin Run bordered this property to the north and it adjoined the Douglass farm (owned by Augusta Douglass but occupied by tenant farmer John Brawner) to the south. The land formed a part of what is known as Stony Ridge. The farm was behind Confederate lines throughout the Second Battle of Manassas.

In 1874 John Cross filed a deposition with the Southern Claims Commission to gain compensation for his wartime losses which amounted to \$1085. He was ultimately awarded \$870 which shows that he was able to demonstrate his loyalty to the Union despite having two sons that served in the Prince William Cavalry (Co. A, 4th Virginia Cavalry). According to the deposition made by Susan Cross, her father was "a Union man and was despised and abused by the neighbors in consequence." Others confirmed that he had taken an Oath of Allegiance during the war.

A tradition persists that Cross was one of the local guides that directed General McDowell's flanking column to Sudley Ford on the morning of July 21, 1861. However, in his deposition, Cross states that after First Manassas he was taken by the Black Horse Cavalry and carried before General Joseph E. Johnston who then questioned him as to whether he had helped the Union army. Cross was released after proving he had been at home that day.

It is believed that the Cross home served as a Confederate field hospital during the Second Battle of Manassas. Although corroborating documentation is elusive, the house would have been ideally situated for such use by Stonewall Jackson's medical staff. A family cemetery is known to exist on the property and it is likely that there could also be unmarked graves in the vicinity for the mortally wounded Confederates who died before they could be transported to a more permanent general hospital further south like at Warrenton or Gordonsville.

After Second Manassas two of John Cross's younger sons discovered a disabled 10-pounder Parrott rifle still on its carriage while exploring the neighboring Brawner Farm. A portion of the muzzle had blown off rendering the tube useless. The gun may have been abandoned on the field by Cooper's Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery after a brief but fierce duel with several Confederate batteries on the morning of August 29. The Cross boys claimed the cannon as a war trophy, dragged it home and hid it for the duration of the hostilities. After the war they propped up the tube (the carriage having deteriorated) between two large boulders and fired it off on special occasions. The tube remained on the farm after it was sold around 1905 to the Akers family but it disappeared under mysterious circumstances in 1965. The accompanying photo was taken about 1930. The man on the right is Barzillia R. Cross, a son of John Cross who likely had a hand in recovering the Parrott rifle in 1862



While actual combat cannot be documented on this acreage, its location on the periphery of the battlefield of Second Manassas still makes this land historically significant. The close proximity of the fighting would have an impact on the property. There is little doubt that troops under Stonewall Jackson occupied reserve positions in this area during the battle and Confederate wounded would have been carried back behind their lines to this vicinity for shelter. It is remarkable that John Cross, a staunch Union man, was able to ride out the storm and continue to live among his neighbors, the majority having southern sympathies.


Manassas Battlefields Viewsheds Plan

Revised: May 10, 2010

Background Study







https://www.loc.gov/resource/ppmsca.20629/

Wounded soldiers at hospital in Fredericksburg, Va.




https://www.loc.gov/resource/ppmsca.33651/

Burying the dead at hospital in Fredericksburg, Va.




https://www.loc.gov/resource/ppmsca.32926/



https://www.loc.gov/resource/stereo.1s02692/

Second day of the second battle of Bull Run, fought Saturday, August 30--the National forces commanded by Major General Pope, and the rebel troops by General Lee, Jackson and Longstreet / from a sketch by our special artist, Mr. Edwin Forbes.




https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3b41007/

Part 4: The 2nd Battle of Manassas, Military Strategy, and The Trap

-The Battlefield Selection

Jackson studied the map and discovered a location that satisfied his criteria perfectly. Stony Ridge, a low rise 1000 yards north of the Warrenton Turnpike near the old Manassas Battlefield, possessed all of Jackson's required virtues. It's heavy woods would conceal the Confederates but allow them a clear view of the highway that might take Pope across Bull Run. Longstreet could link with Jackson there either via the Turnpike or a secondary road leading directly from Thoroughfare Gap. Another byway connected Stony Ridge with Aldie Gap in the Bull Run Mountains, offering an escape route for Jackson if Longstreet somehow failed to arrive. Finally the cuts and fills of an unfinished railroad running along the base of Stony Ridge formed a ready made entrenchment for Jackson's outnumbered divisions. One thoughtful Confederate considered Jackson's move to Stony Ridge "a masterpiece of strategy, unexcelled during the war." [The Second Battle of Manassas text by A. Wilson Greene Published by Eastern National, copyright 2016.]



https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3884m.cw0572800/?r=-0.035,0.223,0.541,0.216,0




-Pageland Combative Defensive Position


2. Early and Forno Guard the Right of the Confederate Line Second Manassas About sunup General Early was ordered to take his own and Forno's Battlefield brigade to the extreme right of Jackson's line to protect against any Federal Map Study movement from the direction of Manassas. Early promptly moved, putting his men on "a commanding ridge" "about a mile" north of the Warrenton Turnpike, west of Pageland Lane. Jackson soon met with Early and directed him to send two of his regiments, the 13th and 31st Virginia, to picket the front. The two regiments moved forward, crossed the turnpike, and established their position along Meadowville Lane. These units were soon skirmishing with the advanced elements of Reynolds' division. Early's report, O.R. Ser. I, Vol. XII, Pt. 2, p. 711; Forno's report, ibid., p. 718; Early's Testimony, Porter Retrial, Pt. 2, pp. 809-10; Early to Porter, July 26, 1878, Porter Papers, Library of Congress; Samuel D. Buck, With the Old Confeds; Actual Experiences of a Captain of the Line (Baltimore, 1925), p. 54.


Early next morning the division, then under command of Brigadier-General Lawton, was formed in line on a ridge perpendicularly to the railroad track, with the right resting on the Warrenton turnpike and facing toward Groveton. In a short time thereafter I received an order from General Jackson to move with my own and Hays' brigade to a ridge west of the turnpike and the railroad track, so as to prevent the enemy from flanking our forces on the right, a movement from the direction of Manassas indicating that purpose having been observed. In making this movement two of my regiments, the Thirteenth and Thirtyfirst Virginia Regiments, were detached by General Jackson and placed in a piece of woods on the east of the turnpike to observe the movements of a body of the enemy that was moving toward our right. I formed my own and Hays' brigade in line on the ridge indicated, placing them under cover in the woods, and advanced skirmishers to the railroad track and posted a detachment on my right flank, so as to prevent any surprise from that direction. Johnson's battery was also placed in position so as to command my front.

In the mean time our whole line of battle had been so modified as to place it along the railroad track, and Lawton's and Trimb.e's brigades were moved so as to conform to this new disposition. My own and Hays' brigades thus constituted the extreme right, being thrown back a little in rear of the direction of the main line. The Thirteenth Virginia Regiment (under Colonel Walker) and the Thirty-first (under Colonel [John S.] Hoffman) by skirmishing kept the body of the enemy's infantry which has been mentioned in check until the head of General Longstreet's corps made its appearance on the Warrenton turn pike from the direction of Gamesville. When this corps had advanced sufficiently, for to render it unusconder for the start of the sufficiently for to render it unusconder for the sufficiently for the render it unusconder for the sufficiently for to render it unusconder for the sufficiently for to render it unusconder for the sufficient of the sufficient is appearance for the sufficient of the suffi

[War of the Rebellion, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Series 1, Vol. 12, PT2, Reports Report of Brigadier General J. A. Early @pg. 711]









Second Manassas Military Activity on the Latsios Tract

The Latsios property south of Route 29, the old Warrenton Turnpike, and west of Pageland Lane is far removed from the battlefield of First Manassas and is clearly not part of the core of the Second Manassas battlefield. However, it could be considered part of what the American Battlefield Protection Program calls the "study area" of the battlefield and a portion falls inside the battlefield's established historic district. It is situated on the periphery and within the viewshed of the Second Manassas battlefield and very likely saw some military activity during the Second Battle of Manassas.

On the afternoon of August 28, 1862, Union General John Reynolds' Pennsylvania Reserve Division (3 brigades), attached to General John Pope's Army of Virginia, was marching eastward from Gainesville on the Warrenton Turnpike with orders to converge upon Manassas Junction where Pope hoped to trap the forces under Stonewall Jackson. Pope was unaware that Jackson had relocated his three divisions on Stony Ridge near Groveton.

Colonel Bradley Johnson's brigade of Jackson's command had been deployed to picket the turnpike near Groveton. Johnson had two rifled artillery pieces from the 1st Virginia Cavalry and, from a commanding position on the Brawner Farm, they opened fire on Reynolds' approaching column. Reynolds' report states, "On arriving at Gainesville the head of my column was fired on by two pieces of the enemy in position on the heights above Groveton and to the left of the turnpike...."

Reynolds initially deployed Captain Ransom's battery to return fire but the range was too far for Ransom's 12pounder smoothbore Napoleons (nearly a mile). The 10-pounder Parrott rifles of Captain Cooper's battery were subsequently brought up which had an effective range of 2,000 yards, well over a mile. The Confederate guns soon withdrew under this more effective counter-battery fire. Based on the known effective ranges for these artillery pieces, the Union guns were evidently positioned west of Pageland Lane along the turnpike during this engagement. Confederate artillery shells and shrapnel would likely have impacted in the vicinity of the Latsios property. According to Reynolds' report, some loss was sustained by Meade's brigade in this action.

After General James Longstreet's arrival on the field on the morning of August 29, the Latsios tract fell behind Confederate lines and no further combat would take place there. Generals Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson held a council of war on the south side of the turnpike shortly after noon that day. The site was subsequently marked by a bronze tablet on a stone in the early 20th century. According to Esther Dogan Terrell, the monument originally stood down a slope near a large oak tree and was later moved up to the shoulder of the highway as seen in the accompanying photo. When Route 29 became a divided highway the marker ended up being in the median strip and, after being hit and damaged in a vehicle accident, the marker was eventually moved in the 1980s to the north side of Route 29 in Conway-Robinson State Forest where it resides today, opposite the Latsios Tract.



Note the lack of vegetation and the pond which still exists on the Latsios Tract. The young lady is Ms. Virginia Speiden Carper (1909-2005).

The heights of Monroe's Hill (now known as Stuart's Hill) to the east of the Latsios Tract would shelter the area from Union artillery fire. Being sheltered, it was a suitable location for a Confederate field hospital and there is some evidence to support the existence of one or more field hospitals and related graves in the vicinity of the Latsios property. Longstreet would suffer some 4,679 killed and wounded after launching a massive counterattack on the Union left flank late in the afternoon of August 30. Some of those casualties would have been carried to the rear along the turnpike. One of those casualties that is well documented is Private Tim Dunklin of Company E, 4th Texas Infantry (Hood's Brigade). Private Dunklin died from his wounds after being carried to the rear and would be buried in the vicinity of the field hospital where he died. In August 1873, W.H. Brown, then owner of the Latsios Tract, conveyed a deed to a small plot on which the family of Tim Dunklin erected a large stone monument in memory of their lost son. That monument still resides on the Latsios Tract and there is reason to believe (based on previous archeological studies done for VDOT) other Confederate graves could remain in the vicinity.

Part 5: Conclusions

Part 1: Conclusions: Part 2: Conclusions: Part 3: Conclusions: Part 4: Conclusions:

3600+ Troops = 4 regiments occupied Pageland Farm Election for camp was for staging and monitoring summer 1861 (landscape considered) Use of Railroad grade for camp placement and activities Pageland was used as a training ground for new army and recruits Heavy artifact area on and around field grounds expected Burials from 15th Alabama not localized to one area 150 expected Additional burials for regiments other than 15th Alabama (21st North Carolina;16th Mississippi; 21st Georgia Regiments) Pageland would be a familiar location for future engagements (The Second Battle of Manassas)

There are accounts to support scores of burials west of Pageland Lane from measles (Pageland Camp Event) 3600+ There are accounts to support scores of burials west of Pageland Land from 2nd Battle of Manassas (mass grave already acknowledged by State of Virginia and NPS)

Burials of casualties from 2nd Battle of Manassas North of Brawner and West of Pageland expected output from multiple field camps and activities during and after 2nd Manassas

Unfinished Railroad likely used for burials topography change

Pageland Lane and Brawner Farm with surrounding landscape chosen for battlefield 24 thousand troops camped and staged north of Brawner Farm Pageland grounds and topography was familiar to troops Jackson emphasized protecting Pageland for a connection with Longstreet Artillery and troop activities including skirmishing on Pageland Farm

Heavy development on Pageland will likely destroy scenic and historic landscape including: topography, viewshed, identifiable landscape markers used for this and future research

Heavy development on Pageland is not consistent with The National Park Service or the State of Virginia's efforts for historic preservation

Heavy development on Pageland will likely unearth artifacts and human remains

Suggestions:

Lands within battlefield study area be designated POS or special Historic zoning to further preservation of American Heritage Site

Funds from future ABPP grants be used for further preservation and education for study area.

Funds from future ABPP grants be used to develop landscape and interpretation plan for CPA weakness as stated by staff

Second Manassas showed how bloody Civil War would be

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June 20, 2018 - 12:01 AM ET Heard on Morning Edition

RETROPOLIS

Bones of Civil War dead found on a battlefield tell their horror stories

By <u>Michael E. Ruane</u> June 20, 2018 at 12:01 a.m. EDT

Home » Remains Of Two Civil War Soldiers Found At Manassas National Battlefield Park

Remains Of Two Civil War Soldiers Found At Manassas National Battlefield Park

By NPT Staff - June 20th, 2018

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AT THE SMITHSONIAN

Newly Unearthed Civil War Bones Speak Silently to the Grim Aftermath of Battle

What the amputated limbs and full skeletons of a Manassas burial pit tell us about wartime surgical practices

Developer finds human remains near Nashville Civil War fort

HOME \ BLOGS \ THE CIVIL WAR

Complete Body of Civil War Soldier Unearthed at Construction Site

Second Manassas showed how bloody Civil War would be

The Washington Post By <u>Steve Vogel</u> March 2, 2012

The hardened armies that would meet at the Second Battle of Manassas in late August 1862 had none of the naive enthusiasm of the men who a year earlier had joyously marched to the fields around Bull Run for a battle they believed would put a quick end to the young war between the states.

If the stunning Confederate victory at First Manassas in July 1861 had shown that a long, hard road lay ahead in this war, Second Manassas would show how bloody it would be.

The nation had been shocked by the toll at the First Battle of Manassas, which saw more than 5,000 casualties, including nearly 900 dead — the bloodiest battle in American history, to that point.

But as the Civil War stretched into its second year, the battles had become deadlier. The armies had grown much larger, the officers more competent, their tactics more proficient. The weapons were deadlier — more rifles with better accuracy and more precise artillery. As much as anything, it was this: The men had become expert at killing and remorseless about it.

In the western theater in April, Union troops under Gen. Ulysses S. Grant clashed with a large Confederate force at Shiloh, leaving more than 20,000 casualties, an unprecedented number. That grim mark was about to be matched on the familiar swales of farmland around Bull Run, 26 miles west of Washington.

'An ungovernable mob'

In the summer of 1862, as Union Gen. George McClellan's Peninsula Campaign bogged down in front of Richmond, President Abraham Lincoln pinned his hopes on another commander who might bring victory. Gen. John Pope, who had achieved modest success in the west, was given command of the newly created Army of Virginia.

Pope quickly earned the enmity of his new army in his first address to the troops when he snidely suggested they lacked the courage of the western soldiers. But Pope had something McClellan lacked: an aggressive streak. The new commander was determined to seek out and destroy the Confederate Army.

In early August, McClellan was ordered to send his troops to Northern Virginia, where they would unite with Pope's army and create an overwhelming force that could crush Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. But McClellan, jealous of Pope's new prominence, delayed his departure for 10 days.

In the division of the Union armies, Lee saw opportunity. Lee would defeat Pope before he could be reinforced.

After several weeks of maneuvering, Lee's and Pope's armies were poised across from each other on opposite sides of the Rappahannock River. Lee developed a bold plan to split his own army.

Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson — his nickname earned by his tenacious stand at First Manassas — would take one wing around Pope's right flank to get behind the enemy. The second wing, under Gen. James Longstreet, would stay at Pope's front — but not for long. Once Pope turned his troops around to chase Jackson, Lee and Longstreet would follow Jackson's path to reunite the army and try to inflict a decisive defeat on the Union force. The Confederate plan carried great risk, presenting Pope with an opportunity to destroy each wing of Lee's army in succession.

On Aug. 25, Jackson launched his 24,000 men on one of the war's great marches, covering more than 50 miles in 34 hours. At dawn Aug. 26, his lead elements passed through the Bull Run Mountains at Thoroughfare Gap and into the rear of Pope's army.

Jackson had an open path to Manassas Junction, the critical railroad hub that gave the ground around Bull Run such strategic importance. Jackson's men, lean, hungry and wide-eyed, fell upon an enormous, undefended federal depot, with warehouses and boxcars filled with rations, helping themselves to cigars and whiskey and wolfing down lobster accompanied by Rhine wine.

"Just imagine about 6000 men hungry and almost naked, let loose on some million dollars worth of biscuit, cheese, ham, bacon, messpork, coffee, sugar, tea, fruit, brandy, wine, whiskey, oysters, coats, pants, shirts, caps, boots, shoes, blankets, tents, etc.," wrote a horrified chaplain from Louisiana. "I saw the whole army become what appeared to me an ungovernable mob."

Union Brig. Gen. George Taylor led more than 1,000 New Jersey troops to the scene, confidently expecting to scatter some Confederate raiders. Instead, they met an explosion of fire from Jackson's army. A quarter of the Union men were lost, and the mortally wounded Taylor urged his officers "for God's sake to prevent another Bull Run."

Pope saw no such danger. He withdrew his 66,000-man army from the Rappahannock and sent them northeast to hunt down Jackson's army. "We shall bag the whole crowd," he declared.

But Jackson was not trapped or trying to escape, as Pope assumed. He moved a few miles northwest and took up a strong position on Stony Ridge, hidden in woods above the Warrenton Turnpike — modern-day Route 29 — along the likely avenue of Union approach. Late in the day, Aug. 28, a Federal column came marching east on the turnpike, in front of his concealed troops.

To the horror of his staff, Jackson rode across broom sedge fields to within musket range of the passing Union troops, who paid no mind to the lone rider. Satisfied that a large Federal force was within his sights, Jackson rode back to the Confederate line and issued orders to his officers: "Bring out your men, gentlemen."

The ensuing fight at Brawner's Farm — which marked the beginning of Second Manassas — was one of the most brutal of the war. It pitted one of the best Union units — Wisconsin and Indiana troops soon known as the Iron Brigade — against the most storied Confederate outfit: the Stonewall Brigade.

Moving up the slope into withering fire, the Union troops almost overran the Confederates, but when the fighting stopped after dark, the Federals had been held off. Almost one-third of the troops engaged had been killed or wounded in the bloody standoff.

"My God, what a slaughter," wrote Pvt. George Fairfield of the 7th Wisconsin.

But worse was to come.

'Like chaff before the tempest'

On the morning of Aug. 29, Jackson placed his troops along a stretch of unfinished rail bed roughly parallel to the turnpike, a well-protected position. Despite the heavy losses, Jackson was sanguine. He knew Longstreet was on his way.

Several times, the Union troops briefly breached the Confederate line, but each time they were pushed back. By the end of the day, four massive but disjointed Union assaults had failed to break through Jackson's left flank, leaving bodies piled before the railroad bank.

"My brave lads were dashed back before the storm of bullets like chaff before the tempest," reported Brig. Gen. Robert Milroy, a Union brigade commander.

An even greater danger lay off Pope's exposed left flank, where Longstreet's wing was taking position, leaving the Union army squeezed inside a giant vise.

Night fell and fighting ended for the day with Pope still unconcerned about the threat, despite warnings from commanders in the field.

Behind Confederate lines, Jackson listened to a lengthy casualty report without comment. Some believed the general was beyond remorse a year into the war. But when surgeon Hunter H. McGuire disclosed that among the dead was 19-year-old Willie Preston, the gentle-natured son of close friends from Lexington, Jackson's muscles twitched and his eyes glowed. "He gripped me by the shoulder till it hurt me, and in a savage, threatening manner asked why I left the boy," McGuire recalled. "In a few seconds he recovered himself, and turned and walked off into the woods alone."

Hurling rocks at Union troops

Saturday, Aug. 30, the final day of the battle, dawned hot, dry and quiet. Though Pope had finally recognized Longstreet's arrival, he ignored the threat and prepared to attack. He sent a wire to Washington reporting the enemy had been "driven from the field" and his expectation that a glorious victory was at hand.

It was almost 3 p.m. when a single Union cannon fired a shot, the attack signal for 12,000 Union soldiers in 37 regiments, lined up in assault formation that stretched more than a mile. In the desperate close-quarters fighting that ensued along the railroad bank, Confederates who had expended all of their ammunition were reduced to hurling rocks at the Union troops.

With his entire line in danger, Jackson sent a message to Lee asking for reinforcements. Now Longstreet opened up with 18 cannons sighted on the open ground where the Federals were advancing. Next he unleashed his five divisions, 25,000 soldiers, stretching nearly a mile and a half. It was the largest single mass assault of the war. With frightful screams, the rebel troops swept forward through fields, streams and woods.

Two New York regiments of Zouaves, who wore gaudy uniforms with baggy red trousers and tasseled fezzes modeled after the French, were the first to pay the price, overrun by Gen. John Bell Hood's Texans. In 10 minutes, the 5th New York lost more men than any regiment would in any other battle of the war — 124 killed and 223 wounded out of 490. To one of Hood's men, the bodies of the Zouaves sprinkled across the slope gave the appearance of "a Texas hillside when carpeted in the spring by wild flowers of many hues and tints."

At last, Pope grasped his ghastly miscalculation and rushed to save his army. He sent troops to occupy the strategic high ground at Henry Hill. A brigade of Ohioans, reinforced by artillery and followed by others, bought time for their comrades with a stand on Chinn Ridge, which lay between Henry Hill and the advancing Confederates. They slowed the Confederate advance, buying 90 precious minutes, but at fearful cost.

Capt. Mark Kern, the commander of a Pennsylvania battery, was one of many who sacrificed his life. "I promised to drive you back, or die under my guns, and I have kept my word," he told the Texans.

Henry Hill was secured, enabling Pope's army to retreat in darkness across Bull Run and eventually to the safety of Washington's fortifications.

"We are whipped again, I am afraid," Lincoln sadly told his secretary, John Hay.


Second Manassas left 3,300 dead, more Americans than have died in a decade of war in Afghanistan. Although it lies just minutes from Interstate 66, the rolling landscape of Manassas National Battlefield Park has a peaceful beauty far removed from 150 years ago, when the mangled and bloody remains of thousands of young men lay in fields and streambeds, on hill slopes and in piles at the foot of the unfinished railroad grade.

Never again would Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia come so close to destroying a Federal army as it did at Second Manassas.


But the Federal army had escaped, and within days, Lee made the fateful decision to invade Maryland. Less than three weeks later, his troops would meet the Union army at Antietam, where a sad new standard of American bloodshed would be set.

vogels@washpost.com


https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/second-manassas-showed-how-bloody-civil-war-wouldbe/2012/02/28/gIQATLmmmR_story.html



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